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THE END OF LEGAL KIDNAPPING IN PENNSYLVANIA:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DECIDED PUBLIC POLICY
FREDERICK N. FRANKf
I. INTRODUCTION
No effective sanction exists against parental kidnapping. Crim-
inal statutes exempt parents explicitly or by judicial interpretation.
Civil remedies are ineffective. Theories of tort recovery are weak
and often barred by the doctrine of parental immunity. The civil
contempt process is of limited applicability and may be circum-
vented by a contrary custody decree in another state.
Moreover, parental kidnapping is not only permitted by the
courts; it is encouraged. A parent who removes his child from a
state customarily is granted a custody hearing in the destination
state even though that parent has defied a custody decree of the
origin stated. 1
T HIS SEEMINGLY ARCHAIC STATEMENT was written in 1976,only four years ago. Yet, surprising as it may be to anyone fa-
miliar with today's laws, 2 this statement accurately summarizes the laws
fPartner, Baskin & Sears, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. B.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1967;
J.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1970. Member, Pennsylvania Bar. Mr. Frank is a member of the
Family Law Council of the Allegheny County Bar Association and the chairman of its subcom-
mittee on Custody Rules and Procedure.
1. Comment, Legalized Kidnapping of Children by Their Parents, 80 DICK. L. REV. 305,
305-06 (1976).
2. For jurisdictions which have enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
thus reflect the predominant, current state of the law, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.010-
.910 (1977); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-401 to -424 (Supp. 1979-1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
34-2701 to -2726 (Supp. 1979); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-5174 (West Supp. 1979); CoLo. REV.
STAT. §§ 14-13-101 to -126 (1973 & Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§46b-90 to -114
(West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1901-1925 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
61.1302-.1348 (West Supp. 1978); CA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-501 to -525 (Supp. 1979); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 5-1001 to -1025 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
40, §§ 2101-2126 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE §§ 31-1-11.6-1 to -24 (Supp. 1979);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598A.1-.25 (West Supp. 1979-1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1301 to -1326
(Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1700-:1724 (West Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, §§ 801-825 (Supp. 1979-1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 184-207 (Supp. 1979); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.651-673 (Supp. 1978-1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518A.01-.25
(Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.440-.550 (Vernon Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 40-7-101 to -125 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1201 to -1225 (Supp. 1979); 1979 Nev. Stat.
134; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458-A:1-:25 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:34-28 to -52
(West Supp. 1979-1980); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 75-a to -z (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-1 to -25 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-14-01 to -26 (1979);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21-.37 (Anderson 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.700-930
(1977); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2301-2325 (Purdon Supp. 1980); R.I. CEN. LAWS §§
15-14-1 to -26 (Supp. 1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 26-5-5 to -52 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE §§
20-125 to -146 (Supp. 1979); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 822.01-.25 (West Supp. 1977); WYO. STAT. §§
20-5-101 to -125 (1977). For a discussion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, see
notes 96-137 and accompanying text infra.
(784)
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which existed throughout many parts of the nation regarding parental
kidnapping at the time.3 Indeed, nowhere was the description more
appropriate than in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Prior to 1977, the Commonwealth lacked a civil statute barring
parental kidnapping and the lone criminal statute 4 proscribing such
activity was rarely utilized.5 Thus, forum shopping by abducting pa-
rents was the rule of the day. This practice was encouraged by
United States Supreme Court 6 and Pennsylvania appellate court de-
cisions 7 which failed to condemn the removal of children to other
jurisdictions in outright defiance of court orders.
The adverse effects of legally sanctioned child snatching did not
go unnoticed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Un-
iform State Laws, who, in 1968, adopted the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).8 The UCCJA, in the view of the Commis-
sioners, was enacted with the purpose of bringing "some semblance
of order into the existing chaos" created by the lack of finality of
custody decrees.' 0
The Commissioners were not merely motivated by a purely legal
concern but were also guided by an awareness of the vast human
3. See Comment, supra note 1, at 305.
4. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2904 (Purdon 1978). Under this statute any person who
"knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any child under the age of 18 years from the custody of
its parent, guardian or other lawful custodian, when he has no privilege to do so" is guilty of a
misdemeanor. Id.
5. See Commonwealth v. Chubb, 3 Pa. D. & C.3d 676 (C.P. Cumberland 1977). In the
Chubb case, the court observed that criminal sanctions have rarely been used in this context
due to a general reluctance on the part of courts to impose criminal penalties upon a parent
who removes his own child from the possession of the other parent. See id. at 678. The court,
however, determined that the purpose of § 2904 was to overcome this inhibition and punish
those who take the law into their own hands. Id. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2904 (Purdon
1978); note 4 supra. Nonetheless, Chubb is the only reported case in which criminal sanctions
have been imposed on a kidnapping parent.
6. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953);
New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); notes 54-91 and accompanying text
infra.
7. See, e.g., In re Irizarry, 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 104, 169 A.2d 307, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
928 (1961); Commonwealth ex rel. Freed v. Freed, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 93 A.2d 863 (1953);
notes 17-53 and accompanying text infra.
8. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28, reprinted in 9 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 111 (1979). For a list of the states which have enacted the UCCJA, see note 2 supra.
9. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, re-
printed in 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 111, 114 (1979).
10. See id., reprinted in 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 111, 112 (1979). The Commissioners noted:
It is well known that those who lose a court battle over custody are often unwilling to
accept the judgment of the court. They will remove the child in an unguarded moment
... and will seek their luck in the court of a distant state where they hope to find-and
often do find-a more sympathetic ear for their plea for custody.
Id. See generally id. § I (section stating the purposes of the Act), reprinted in 9 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. 111, 116 (1979).
2
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costs of continued uncertainty in the custody process. They noted
that the lack of finality in custody matters introduced elements of
insecurity and instability into many young lives, threatening the emo-
tional well-being of these children. 1
With the UCCJA's concern for children as an impetus, Pennsyl-
vania's role as the protector of the kidnapping parent has been com-
pletely reversed. 12  Through both legislative'3 and judicial action,'
4
the Commonwealth has formulated a decided public policy which de-
nies aid and comfort to a parent who takes a child from the other
parent in contravention of a valid court order.
This article will trace the development of Pennsylvania's current
policy, comparing the previous law with today's impediments to pa-
rental kidnapping.15  In addition, it will discuss some of the deficien-
cies in the current law which have the potential to lessen its effec-
tiveness. 16
II. PENNSYLVANIA'S LAW PRIOR TO THE CHILD
CUSTODY ACTS-A HAVEN FOR CHILD-SNATCHERS
Prior to Pennsylvania's enactment of the UCCJA 17 and the
Commonwealth Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (CCCJA),18 a noncus-
todial parent who contemplated abducting a child from a custodial
parent in Pennsylvania or any other state, could count on considera-
ble help from the Pennsylvania courts which gave prior custody
awards little effect.
19
The classic parental kidnapping case generally occurred in the
following manner. Custody of the child was awarded to one parent by
a court in State A where the child resided. 20 Pursuant to the parties'
11. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, re-
printed in 9 UNIFORM LAWs ANN. 111, 112 (1979). One of the stated purposes of the UCCJA is
to "discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater stability of
home environment and of secure family relationships for the child." Id. § 1(a)(4), reprinted in 9
UNIFORM LAXVS ANN. 111, 117 (1979).
12. See generally notes 92-194 and accompanying text infra.
13. See Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2301-2325 (Pur-
don Supp. 1980); Commonwealth Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§
2401-2424 (Purdon Supp. 1980); notes 92-150 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 152-78 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 17-53 & 92-150 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 150-78 and accompanying text infra.
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 9 2301-2325 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 9 2401-2424 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
19. See notes 22-53 and accompanying text infra. The UCCJA deals with interstate child
abduction, the CCCJA with intrastate (inter county) incidents. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 9
2302, 2402 (Purdon Supp. 1980); notes 92-150 and accompanying text infra.
20. The terms "'esidence" and "domicile" generally have different meanings. See In re
Lesker, 377 Pa. 411, 418, 105 A.2d 376, 380 (1954). For purposes of the discussion of prior
[Vol. 25: p. 784
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agreement allowing the noncustodial parent visitation rights, the child
would go to the state B residence of the noncustodial parent for a
short visit. At some point, either before or during the child's visit,
the noncustodial parent would formulate a desire for full custody.
Eventually, that parent would file a complaint in state B seeking cus-
tody of the child.
2'
Under such circumstances, the Pennsylvania courts had consis-
tently held that they had jurisdiction to adjudicate the noncustodial
parent's petition despite the fact that Pennsylvania's contacts with the
child were de minimis.22  A case in point is In re Irizarry.2 3  In
Irizarry, a court in Puerto Rico had awarded custody of two minor
children to their father who resided with them in Puerto Rico.
2 4
The children then came to Pennsylvania to visit their mother.
2 5
Thirteen days after the children arrived in Pennsylvania, the mother
filed a petition in the local court of common pleas requesting cus-
tody.2 6 The father entered preliminary objections to the court's
jurisdiction, claiming 1) that a Pennsylvania court was obligated to
afford full faith and credit to the custody decree entered in Puerto
Rico, 27 and 2) that the Pennsylvania court did not have jurisdiction to
determine custody because the children were in the state merely for
a short visit.2 8 The court of common pleas dismissed both prelimi-
Pennsylvania law, however, the words are used interchangeably since either domicile or resi-
dence of the child in Pennsylvania was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the state's courts. See In
re Irizarry, 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 104, 106, 169 A.2d 307, 309, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 928 (1961).
21. The facts of the hypothetical in the text are based upon the case of In re Irizarry, 195
Pa. Super. Ct. 104, 106, 169 A.2d 307, 308, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 928 (1961).
In Pennsylvania, actions challenging a party's right to have legal custody of a child are
initiated by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6503 (Purdon
1979). See also A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, PENNSYLVANIA FAMILY LAW § 5.6.1 (1977).
22. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 367 Pa. 553, 560, 80 A.2d 829,
833 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Logan v. Toomey, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 80, 84-85, 359 A.2d
468, 470 (1976); Coombs v. Coombs, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 304, 307, 303 A.2d 498, 499 (1973); In
re Irizarry, 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 104, 109, 169 A.2d 307, 309, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 928 (1961).
The exercise of jurisdiction despite the lack of significant contacts between the forum and
the child was a matter of serious concern to the drafters of the UCCJA. See UNIFORM CHILD
CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, § 1(a)(3), reprinted in UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 111, 117 (1979). A
stated purpose of the Act is to assure that custody litigation will generally take place in the state
with which the child and his family have the closest connections and in which evidence con-
cerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily availa-
ble. Id.
23. 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 104, 169 A.2d 307, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 928 (1961).
24. 195 Pa. Super. Ct. at 106, 169 A.2d at 308.
25. Id. The mother had remarried and was living in Pennsylvania. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. For a discussion of United States Supreme Court decisions concerning full faith, and
credit for custody decrees, see notes 54-91 and accompanying text infra.
28. 195 Pa. Super. Ct. at 106, 169 A.2d at 308.
4
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nary objections 2 9 and, on appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed.30
In rejecting the father's contentions, the superior court main-
tained that a prior custody decree rendered by a sister jurisdiction
was entitled to full faith and credit only "so far as it determined the
status of the child at the time it was issued";3' thus, if a Pennsylvania
court had jurisdiction over the child it could render a new decree.
32
The court had little trouble determining that it had sufficient
jurisdiction to redetermine the custody issue despite the fact that the
children were in Pennsylvania only thirteen days when the complaint
for custody was filed.3 3 Applying Pennsylvania's rule that jurisdiction
in custody cases follows either the domicile or residence of the
child, 34 the court held that the children's presence in the state for
visitation purposes constituted residence and, hence, there was juris-
diction to hear the case.
35
29. Id.
30. Id. at 110, 169 A.2d at 310.
31. Id. at 107-08, 169 A.2d at 308-09. The court based its determination on the fact that
custody decrees are temporary in nature and are therefore modifiable in light of changing condi-
tions. Id. at 108, 169 A.2d at 309. This position was consistent with that of the first Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 147-48. The Restate-
ment's position was that a valid custody decree must be enforced in all states. Id. § 147. If
another state found, however, that the custodian of the child was unfit, then the state, if it had
jurisdiction, could make a new custody determination. Id. § 148. For a general discussion of
custody decrees and the full faith and credit clause, see H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS § 11.5 (1968); Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REV.
345 (1953); notes 54-91 and accompanying text infra.
32. 195 Pa. Super. Ct. at 109, 169 A.2d at 309.
33. See id. at 108, 169 A.2d at 309.
34. Id. The jurisdictional rule applied by the court in lrizarry represents only one of various
analytical approaches to jurisdiction in custody cases which have been employed in the United
States. See Comment, supra note 1, at 314-17. Other jurisdictions have applied a strict
domicile-of-the-child test, or a personal-jurisdiction-over-the-parents test to determine if they
possessed the power to render a custody decree. See id.
Professor Clark has expressed the belief "that judicial opinions on [custody jurisdiction] are
in hopeless conflict." H. CLARK, supra note 31, § 11.5, at 320. He reasoned that the
jurisdictional analysis in custody cases differs from the approach taken in other areas of the law
because in custody cases, courts seem to decide the merits of the dispute before the jurisdic-
tional issue. Thus, if a court believed that a custody decree was in the best interests of the child
it would grant the decree, resting jurisdiction on any contacts it could find between the forum
and the parties. Id. A plurality of the United States Supreme Court has concluded that personal
jurisdiction over both parents is necessary to render a valid custody decree. See May v. Ander-
son, 345 U.S. 528, 531 (1953). For a discussion of May, see notes 63-76 and accompanying text
infra.
35. 195 Pa. Super. Ct. at 109, 169 A.2d at 309. The court relied on a definition of residence
as "a tarrying place for some specific purpose of business or pleasure." Id., citing In re Lesker,
377 Pa. 411, 418, 105 A.2d 376, 380 (1954). The court in Irizarry agreed that the child was not
a Pennsylvania domiciliary for the domicile of a child is that of the custodial parent. See 195 Pa.
Super. Ct. at 108, 169 A.2d at 309.
5
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The Irizarry case was interpreted to allow Pennsylvania courts to
take custody jurisdiction any time a child was present in the state
even though there was a prior foreign state order expressly retaining
jurisdiction over the matter or forbidding removal of the children.
36
Throughout the years in which Irizarry was repeatedly followed,
37
the only jurisdictional barrier that faced a parent seeking custody was
the fact that the courts would not entertain custody complaints before
the child's arrival in Pennsylvania.
38
Intrastate custody disputes, where the child snatching occurred
across county lines, were subject to the same jurisdictional analysis as
were interstate disputes. In Commonwealth ex rel. Freed v. Freed,
39
the local court of common pleas awarded custody of a minor girl to
the mother and visitation rights to the father. 40 The mother reestab-
lished her domicile in another county and subsequently refused to
allow the father to see the child in clear contravention of the custody
decree. 41 In response to the denial of visitation, the court of com-
mon pleas revoked its original order and entered a new decree grant-
ing custody to the father. 42  The mother then filed a petition request-
ing the court to rescind its second order which it refused to do. 43 On
appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the lower court
The result of the holding in Irizarry was to afford no deference whatsoever to the Puerto
Rico decree since, on the merits, the Pennsylvania court was not confined to a consideration of
new circumstances but could also reexamine the facts which led to the original decree. See id.
See also Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 631, 641, 98 A.2d
437, 441 (1953).
36. See Commonwealth ex rel. Mason v. Mason, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 433, 437, 249 A.2d 922,
925 (1968).
37. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Gillard, 203 Pa. Super. Ct. 95, 99, 198
A.2d 377, 379 (1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Lovell v. Shaw, 202 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 343, 195
A.2d 878, 880 (1963).
38. See Commonwealth ex rel. Blank v. Rutledge, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 342, 339 A.2d 71,
74 (1975). In Blank, the father, a Pennsylvania resident, has been awarded visitation rights by a
New Jersey court. Id. at 341, 339 A.2d at 71. Prior to one of the scheduled visits, the father
filed a petition for custody in Pennsylvania which was granted. Id. at 342, 339 A.2d at 71-72. A
plurality of the superior court reversed, holding that it was error for the lower court to have
assumed jurisdiction over the matter before the child entered the state. Id. at 347, 339 A.2d at
74. The plurality, in accord with the rule in Irizarry, stated that while custody decrees are
modifiable in light of changing conditions, "[tihe child must however, be within the jurisdiction
of the decree-granting state; otherwise the state is without power to determine its status." Id. at
343-44, 339 A.2d at 72-73. A reasonable inference from Blank is that all the father had to do in
order to have been successful was wait until the visitation period began before he filed his
complaint.
39. 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 93 A.2d 863 (1953).
40. Id. at 278, 93 A.2d at 863.
41. Id. at 278, 93 A.2d at 864.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 279, 93 A.2d at 864.
6
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was without jurisdiction to modify its initial order since at the time of
the modification the child was no longer a domiciliary or a resident of
the county."
The Freed case is not a classic example of child snatching 45 for it
did not involve the taking of a child by a noncustodial parent across
county borders to escape a prior custody decree. The practical effect
of its holding, however, as applied in subsequent cases, 46 was that
such a taking could occur in Pennsylvania with impunity. Since the
court which entered the original decree in Freed lacked jurisdiction
to modify its order once the child left the county, there was nothing
to stop another court from entering a new decree. 47  Thus, the law in
Pennsylvania clearly encouraged parents to move children both inter-
and intrastate from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in order to escape pos-
sible adverse custody decisions.
Another consequence of Pennsylvania's law prior to enactment of
the UCCJA and CCCJA was the ability of a custodial parent to thwart
a noncustodial parent's partial custody or visitation rights by fleeing
the jurisdiction. 48  As a general proposition, when a custodial parent
refused to honor the noncustodial parent's visitation rights, the
Pennsylvania courts would enforce the noncustodial parent's prima
facie right to visitation. 49 However, as illustrated by Freed, the cus-
todial parent could take the child out of the county or state, stripping
the original court of jurisdiction. 50 If the preceding scenario oc-
44. Id. at 280, 93 A.2d at 864. The court stated:
When that order was made neither the mother nor the minor child resided in Washington
County nor was present in the county at that time. The jurisdiction of a court in a pro-
ceeding involving custody is determined by the domicile or residence of the child ...
[W]hen [the mother] took the child with her and established a new residence ...the
child acquired the domicile of its mother in Bedford County .... While the court had the
authority to make the original order, it lost its jurisdiction to modify or make a new order
when both parents left Washington County.
Id.
45. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
46. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 332, 336, 264
A.2d 420, 422 (1970); Swigart v. Swigart, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 174, 177, 163 A.2d 716, 718
(1960).
47. See Commonwealth Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2402(a)(1)
(Purdon Supp. 1980). One of the stated purposes of the CCCJA is to "avoid jurisdictional com-
petition and conflict with courts of the respective counties of the Commonwealth in matters of
child custody which in the past resulted in the shifting of children from county to county with
harmful effects on their well-being." Id. See also I PA. LEG. J. 1092 (House daily ed. April 12,
1978) (remarks of Rep. Rhodes).
48. See Commonwealth ex rel. Freed v. Freed, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. at 278, 93 A.2d at 864.
The reason for the attempted modification of the initial custody decree in Freed was that the
mother had denied the father visitation with the child. Id. For a discussion of the facts in
Freed, see notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra.
49. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Sorace v. Sorace, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 42, 44, 344 A.2d
553, 554 (1976); A. MOMJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, supra note 21, § 5.5.
50. See notes 39-47 and accompanying text supra.
7
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curred, the noncustodial parent would be forced to begin anew the
quest for enforcement of his or her rights in another jurisdiction, pro-
vided the child could be located at all. 5 '
Thus, Pennsylvania law prior to the enactment of the UCCJA
and CCCJA provided no deterrent to the parent who wished to shop
around for a favorable decree. 52 It cannot be said, however, that the
Pennsylvania courts were out of step with contemporary juridical
views since, during the same period, the decisions of the nation's
highest court in this area did much to further the confusion caused by
conflicting custody orders.
53
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DENIAL OF
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT- IN INTERSTATE
CUSTODY DISPUTES
The United States Constitution provides that "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State." 54 Armed with this provi-
sion, parents who were the victims of child snatching sought relief
from the United States Supreme Court.55 They found, however, that
the Court would not interpret the Constitution to bar relitigation of
custody decrees.
56
The first case in which the Court confronted the constitutional
implications of parental kidnapping was New York ex rel. Halvey v.
Halvey 57 where the Court upheld a New York court's modification of
51. See generally Kidnapping: A Family Affair, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 1976, at 24; Moving to
Stop Child Snatching, TIMaE, Feb. 27, 1978, at 85. It is suggested that the jurisdictional analysis
favored by the Pennsylvania courts also worked against the interests of the noncustodial parent
who tried to obtain a modification of a custody decree, because it permitted the custodial parent
to leave the jurisdiction and thereby force the other parent to litigate away from home.
52. See notes 22-51 and accompanying text supra. Ironically, even where a custodial parent
fled to escape the jurisdiction of a court in a custody matter, that parent could still require the
payment of support. See REVISED UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6770 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (a pending custody action in another state
does not stay a support action in Pennsylvania provided that the other jurisdictional requisites
are met).
53. See notes 54-91 and accompanying text infra.
54. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. This section of the Constitution also provides that "the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id. The statute implementing this grant of authority
requires in part that "[s]uch Acts, records and judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they
are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1736 (1976).
55. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953);
New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
56. See notes 57-91 and accompanying text infra.
57. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
1979-1980]
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a custody order originally issued by a Florida court.58 In so holding,
the Court reasoned that the full faith and credit clause does not re-
quire that a judgment be accorded "a more conclusive or final effect
in the state of the forum than it has in the state where rendered." 59
In Florida, custody orders were not considered to be final and were
modifiable whenever the welfare of the child required it.60 Thus,
the Court held that the New York court could also modify the de-
cree. 61 In a prophetic concurrence, Justice Rutledge recognized that
the Court's decision made "possible a continuing round of litigation
over custody, perhaps also of abduction, between alienated pa-
rents." 
62
The question of whether a custody decree rendered without per-
sonal jurisdiction over a contesting parent is entitled to full faith and
credit was discussed by the Court in May v. Anderson.63  In May,
the father obtained an ex parte divorce and custody order from a
Wisconsin court. 64 The mother had been served with process but
chose not to appear in the action. 65 Subsequently, the mother, who
had moved to Ohio two months prior to the ex parte divorce, refused
to return the children after a visit. 66 The father filed a petition for
habeas corpus in Ohio challenging the right of the mother to retain
custody. 67 The Ohio court held for the father on the ground that the
58. Id. at 615. In Halvey, the mother instituted a divorce proceeding in Florida obtaining
service of process on the father, a New York resident, by publication. Id. at 611. The father
made no appearance in the action and subsequently the Florida court granted the mother a
divorce, awarding her permanent custody of the child. Id. at 611-12. The day prior to the
issuance of that decree, the father took the child back to New York without the mother's know-
ledge or consent. Id. at 611. The mother filed a habeas corpus petition in New Yolk challenging
the father's detention of the child. Id. After a hearing, the New York court modified the terms
of the Florida order by, inter alia, allowing the father visitation rights and custody of the child
during vacations. Id. at 612.
59. Id. at 614, citing Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 264 (1890).
60. See 330 U.S. at 612.
61. Id. at 614-15.
62. Id. at 619-20 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Justice Jackson concurred separately on the
ground that Florida had no jurisdiction to issue the initial decree. Id. at 616 (Jackson, J., con-
curring). Similarly, Justice Frankfurter rested his concurrence on grounds relating to the valid-
ity of the initial decree. Id. at 619 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
63. 345 U.S. 528 (1952). The Halvey Court had expressly left open the question of whether
a custody decree rendered without in personam jurisdiction over one or both of the parents
could have any binding effect over such nonparty parents. 330 U.S. at 615.
64. 345 U.S. at 530-31.
65. Id. at 531. The mother had been personally served with process in Ohio pursuant to a
Wisconsin statute which allowed such service in divorce proceedings. Id. The statute was not,
however, applicable to custody proceedings. Id. The mother thus asserted a lack of jurisdiction
in relation to the custody decree only. Id.
66. Id. at 532.
67. Id. In Ohio, habeas corpus was available only to determine who had the right to im-
mediate possession of the children. Id. It was not available to modify any former custody
awards. Id. Compare this procedure with that followed in Halvey where, in a habeas corpus
9
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Wisconsin custody decree was entitled to full faith and credit.68 On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
69
Writing for a plurality of the Court, 70 Justice Burton reasoned
that a mother's right to custody is a personal right and therefore can-
not be denied by a court which lacks personal jurisdiction over
her.71  Thus, the plurality found that since the Wisconsin custody
proceeding, a New York court modified a prior Florida decree reexamining all the facts it
deemed necessary to determine what the child's welfare required. See id. at 532 & n.4, citing
New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947). Thus, unlike the Halvey Court,
the May Court could not base its determination on the lack of finality of the initial foreign
decree since the Ohio court could not, under that state's habeas corpus procedure, modify the
original decree. Therefore, the May Court had to reach the question of the validity of the initial
custody order. See 345 U.S. at 532. For a discussion of the use of the writ of habeas corpus in
custody cases, see H. CLARK, supra note 31, § 17.3.
68. 345 U.S. at 529.
69. Id. at 535.
70. A majority of the court consisting of Justices Burton, Vinson, Black, Douglas, and
Frankfurter agreed that the Wisconsin decree was not entitled to full faith and credit. See id. at
534 (plurality opinion); id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The four-member plurality
rested its decision on the ground that there was a jurisdictional defect in the initial decree. Id.
at 533 (plurality opinion). See notes 71-72 and accompanying text infra. Justice Frankfurter
decided the issue on other grounds. See 345 U.S. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); note
71 infra.
71. 345 U.S. at 533-34 (plurality opinion). The plurality in making its jurisdictional finding
referred to the doctrine of divisible divorce. Id. & n.6. Applying this doctrine, the Court had
previously held that a state which is the domicile of one of the marital partners may grant a
divorce decree which is entitled to full faith and credit insofar as it dissolves the marital status,
even though the granting court lacks personal jurisdiction over the nonresident party. See
Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). In those same
cases, however, the Court also held that the due process clause prohibits a court from altering
the legal incidences of marriage, such as alimony or support, without personal jurisdiction over
both parties. See 334 U.S. at 557; 334 U.S. at 549.
The jurisdictional predicate of Justice Burton's opinion created problems for the drafters of
the UCCJA. See Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Re-
medy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1232-33 (1969).
Bodenheimer was the reporter for the Special Committee of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws which prepared the UCCJA. Id. at 1207. In the Vanderbilt article, she states that
the drafters of the Act attempted to accommodate the May plurality's position that in personam
jurisdiction over the parent was required by developing a long-arm provision which would have
granted courts jurisdiction to reach parents who had fled out of state in the face of a custody
action. Id. at 1232. Bodenheimer contends that the drafters abandoned their efforts because
they felt that they could not design a provision which would reach a parent who had never been
a resident of the forum state. See id.; cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) (due process requires that a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum).
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, criticized the plurality's jurisdictional ap-
proach. See 345 U.S. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Questioning the plurality's reliance
on Kreiger and Estin, he claimed that the interests at stake in custody cases are different from
those in marital property determinations and, therefore, although ex parte alimony and property
division orders violate due process, it does not necessarily follow that a custody decree, ren-
dered without in personam jurisdiction over a parent, violates that parent's due process rights.
See id. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Hence, Justice Frankfurter concluded that the plur-
ality had merely held that the full faith and credit clause does not require prior custody decrees
to be accorded binding effect, thus leaving state courts free to give these decrees comity if the
10
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decree was rendered without in personam jurisdiction, it was not en-
titled to be given full faith and credit by the Ohio courts.
72
In his dissenting opinion in May, Justice Jackson severely
criticized the Court's ruling. 73 He considered anomalous the plurali-
ty's conclusion "that the state in which a child and one parent are
domiciled and which is primarily concerned about his welfare cannot
constitutionally adjudicate controversies as to his guardianship.
'" 74
As a result of the plurality opinion in May, a parent who antici-
pated a custody action by the other parent, or who was actually aware
of the initiation of such an action but had not yet been served with
process, could remove himself from the jurisdiction and constitution-
ally avoid a subsequent custody decree issued by a court in that
jurisdiction. 75  This result is even more disturbing when one recog-
nizes that Wisconsin, the state where the custody proceeding was
initiated in May, was the logical forum to determine custody since
the children had resided there most of their lives and most relevant
information concerning their welfare was present there. 76 Still, a
plurality of the court believed that Wisconsin had no jurisdiction be-
cause one parent had fled to Ohio, a conclusion which seems to fail to
take the interests of the children into account..
The Court's opinion in Ford v. Ford77 is another striking exam-
ple of the Court's reluctance to use the full faith and credit clause to
bar relitigation of custody status by one state after a decree has been
courts so choose. Id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For Justice Frankfurter, this reading
of the plurality's opinion was necessarily the only proper one in light of his belief that the
interest of a state in the welfare of the child overrides the "interest of national unity that
underlies the Full Faith and Credit Clause." Id. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The Frankfurter opinion, with its suggested limitation on the plurality approach, has been
interpreted to allow states to recognize a foreign custody decree despite the absence of personal
jurisdiction over a parent. See Bodenheimer, supra, at 1232. Any other reading would leave
open the possibility of upsetting a child's life at a later time by permitting subsequent chal-
lenges by noncustodial parents who assert that the court which issued the decree deprived them
of a property interest without due process. Id.
72. 345 U.S. at 533 (plurality opinion).
73. Id. at 536-42 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 539 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson, unlike Justice Frankfurter, inter-
preted the plurality opinion as holding that Ohio could not give comity effect to the Wisconsin
decree as a matter of due process because the Wisconsin court lacked in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant. See id. at 536-37 (Jackson, J., dissenting); cf. note 71 supra. In Justice
Jackson's view, the fact that the children and the husband were domiciled in Wisconsin was
sufficient to vest custody jurisdiction in the Wisconsin court and, thus, the Wisconsin decree
was entitled to full faith and credit in Ohio. 345 U.S. at 538-42 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
75. See 345 U.S. at 530-32. The Wisconsin action was filed within a month after the mother
had left Wisconsin with the children. Id. at 530.
76. See id. at 537-38 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also Gessler v. Gessler, 78 So. 2d 722,
723 (Fla. 1955) (Florida court, in dismissing custody action brought by a noncustodial father for
lack of personal jurisdiction over the mother, noted that Pennsylvania, where mother and chil-
dren had most substantial contacts, was the best place to try the case).
77. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
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rendered by another. Ford further illustrates how the Court's ap-
proach sanctions child snatching.
In Ford, the father instituted a habeas corpus proceeding in Vir-
ginia seeking custody of his three children. 78 The parties eventually
agreed that the father was to have custody, whereupon the Virginia
court dismissed the petition. 79 Later, in a classic example of a parent
trying to alter custody when equipped with the jurisdictional advan-
tage, 80 the mother petitioned a South Carolina court for custody
when the children were visiting her in that state.8 ' The Supreme
Court of South Carolina reversed a lower court's grant of the request,
finding that the dismissal by the Virginia court was res judicata,
hence final and entitled to full faith and credit.8 2 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the dismissal was not res
judicata since the issue of custody could be relitigated in the Virginia
courts.8 3  Thus, the dismissal could have no greater effect in South
Carolina than in Virginia and the South Carolina court's were there-
fore not barred from deciding who should be granted custody.84
In reaching its decision that Virginia would not treat the dismis-
sal of the action as res judicata, the Court was swayed by Virginia's
strong public policy that all custody orders are modifiable because the
welfare of the infant is paramount. 8 5 Consequently, the Court
opined that it was unlikely that the Virginia courts would have been
bound by a "mere order of dismissal." 8 6 Yet, despite the Court's
seeming concern for the interests of the child, it failed to consider the
great potential for harm to the child's welfare created by its counte-
nance of conflicting custody orders.8 7 If, in fact, the paramount issue
ensuring optimum conditions for the welfare of the child, the Court
should have been looking for the jurisdiction which could have best
decided the issue with the least disruption to the child's life. 88
78. 1d. at 188.
79. Id. The agreement was that the father would have custody of the children during the
school year and the mother would have custody during vacations. Id.
80. For the typical facts of a child snatching case, see notes 20-21 and accompanying text
supra.
81. 371 U.S. at 188.
82. See Ford v. Ford, 239 S.C. 305, 317, 123 S.E.2d 33, 39 (1961).
83. 371 U.S. at 192-93.
.84. Id. at 194.
85. Id. at 192.
86. Id. at 194. The Court's conclusion was founded upon its belief that South Carolina
would deem a dismissal based on a settlement to be res judicata only where there were strictly
private interests at stake, and not, as in a custody case, where there is a strong public interest
involved. Id.
87. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
88. See Ratner, Child Custody In A Federal System, 62 MicH. L. REV. 795, 809 (1964). For
further discussion of Ford, see Comment, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody
Decrees?, 73 YALE L.J. 134 (1963).
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It is important to note that the Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly held that valid custody decrees are not entitled to full faith
and credit. Indeed, the Court has refused to do so on at least three
occasions.8 9 However, the thrust of the Court's custody opinions
leads one to conclude that the Court has gone to great lengths to find
a lack of finality9 ° or invalidity 9' in custody decrees, thus avoiding
the constitutional issue resulting from relitigation of such orders.
IV. THE ENACTMENT OF THE UNIFORM AND
COMMONWEALTH CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACTS
Clearly, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and
the Pennsylvania appellate courts did little to prevent a parent from
taking a child across jurisdictional borders in violation of a prior cus-
tody decree with a resulting loss of jurisdiction in the court having
the strongest contacts with the child.9 2 Against this background, the
Pennsylvania Legislature began to grapple with the issue of interstate
and intercounty custody disputes. Its response was the enactment of
two separate pieces of legislation. The first was the UCCJA. 93 The
second was the CCCJA. 94 Both Acts represent a complete rejection
of prior national and state law as it pertained to custody jurisdiction.
A. The UCCJA
The drafters of the UCCJA sought to limit custody jurisdiction
"to the state where the child has his home or where there are other
strong contacts with the child and his family." 95 This goal has been
implemented in part by vesting custody jurisdiction in the courts of
the child's "home state."
96
The home state is defined in the UCCJA as the state where,
immediately preceding the commencement of the custody proceed-
89. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 607
(1958); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615-16 (1947).
90. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192-94 (1962).
91. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 532-35 (1952).
92. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2301-2325 (Purdon Supp. 1980). The effective date of the Act
was July 1, 1977. Id. § 2301. The UCCJA of Pennsylvania is a reciprocal Act for it requires
Pennsylvania to recognize out-of-state decrees only if they were rendered in conformity with the
Act. Id. § 2314. For a list of the states which have enacted the UCCJA, see note 2 supra.
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §9 2401-2424 (Purdon Supp. 1980). The effective date of the Act
was June 27, 1978. Id. § 2401.
95. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, re-
printed in 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 111, 114 (1979). See Bodenheimer, supra note 71, at 1218.
96. For a discussion of the "home state" concept, see notes 97-99 and accompanying text
infra.
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ing, the child lived for at least six consecutive months or, in the case
of an infant less than six-months old, since birth. 97 The Act provides
that Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over a custody dispute when it is
the home state of the child at the time of the initiation of the ac-
tion, 98 or when it had been the home state of the child but the child
is now absent because of removal or retention by a person claiming
custody. 99
The concept of a home state is not the only basis of jurisdiction
under the Act as there are four other grounds of jurisdiction which
would allow Pennsylvania courts to hear a custody case.' 00  In addi-
tion to the home state concept, a second ground permits Pennsyl-
vania to assume jurisdiction over a custody dispute where the best
interests of the child require it because 1) the child and at least one
contestant have a "significant connection" with the Common-
wealth, 10 1 and 2) substantial evidence concerning the child's present
or future care, protection, and personal relationships is available in
Pennsylvania. 10 2 A third basis permits Pennsylvania courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction where the child is physically present in the state and
has been abandoned, 10 3 or when the court's action is necessary to
protect the child because he or she has been subjected to or is
threatened with abuse or neglect.
10 4
The fourth basis for jurisdiction exists when the court finds that
no other state would have jurisdiction under the three bases previ-
ously discussed, or when another state has declined to exercise juris-
diction on the ground that Pennsylvania is the more appropriate
forum to determine custody of the child. 10 5 In either instance, it
must be in the best interest of the child that Pennsylvania assume
jurisdiction. 106
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2303 (Purdon Supp. 1980). This section also provides that
periods of temporary absence are counted as part of the six-month period, id.
98. Id. § 2304(a)(1)(i).
99. Id. § 2304(a)(1)(ii). For this subsection to apply, one parent must still continue to live in
Pennsylvania. Id.
100. Id. §§ 2304(a)(2)-(5).
101. Id. § 2304(a)(2)(i).
102. Id. § 2304(a)(2)(ii). This significant contacts test may result in two states having jurisdic-
tion: the home state and a state other than the home state which has the requisite contacts. To
deal with such an event, the drafters of the Act developed a mechanism to determine the best
forum and avoid jurisdictional conflicts. See id. §§ 2307-2308. The drafters, however, stressed
that the Act requires interstate judicial cooperation and communication for the purpose of estab-
lishing the most convenient forum and avoiding simultaneous proceedings with inconsistent re-
sults. See UNIFORINI CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 7, Commissioners' Note reprinted in
9 UNIFORMI LAWS ANN. 111, 139 (1979).
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2304(a)(3)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
104. Id. § 2304(a)(3)(ii).
105. Id. § 2304(a)(4)(i).
106. Id. § 2304(a)(4)(ii).
1979-1980]
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The fifth and final basis for jurisdiction in Pennsylvania is present
when "the child welfare agencies of the counties wherein the contes-
tants for the child live, have made an investigation of the home of the
person to whom custody is awarded and have found it to be satisfac-
tory for the welfare of the child." 107
While physical presence of the child in Pennsylvania is desirable,
it is not required for jurisdiction to vest under the Act.'10  Indeed,
physical presence alone is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 109 In
two circumstances, however, physical presence combined with
another factor will suffice. The two factors, either of which combined
with physical presence will confer jurisdiction, are: 1) where no other
state would have jurisdiction or another state has declined jurisdiction
in favor of Pennsylvania; 110 or 2) where the child is abandoned or
neglected. "'
There are certain instances where the assumption of jurisdiction
under the Act is specifically forbidden. If, at the time of the institu-
tion of a custody action in Pennsylvania, a custody proceeding is
pending in another state's court which is exercising jurisdiction in
substantial conformity with the Act, Pennsylvania must not assume
jurisdiction. 112 The only exception to this rule is where the other
state stays its proceeding because Pennsylvania is a more appropriate
forum or because of "other reasons." 113
In addition, although the Act's jurisdictional provisions are
equally applicable to either initial custody or modification proceed-
ings, 114 there are restrictions concerning the exercise of that jurisdic-
tion in modification cases. The most basic restriction is that a
Pennsylvania court cannot modify an out-of-state decree unless it ap-
pears that the issuing court no longer has jurisdiction under the
Act. 115
107. Id. § 2304(a)(5). This provision was added when Pennsylvania enacted this legislation
and is not part of the Act drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See UNIFORM
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, reprinted in 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 111, 122-23
(1979).
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2304(c) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
109. Id. § 2304(b).
110. Id. § 2304(a)(4).
111. Id. § 2304(a)(3).
112. Id. § 2307(a).
113. Id.
114. Id. § 2304(a).
115. Id. § 2315(a)(1). This provision also permits the assumption of jurisdiction if the original
state has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify. Id. If Pennsylvania does assume modifica-
tion jurisdiction, this section requires that the Pennsylvania court communicate with the other
state court and "give due consideration to the transcript of the record and other documents of
all previous proceedings. ... Id. § 2315(b). This section is designed to achieve greater stabil-
ity of custody arrangements and to avoid forum shopping by creating a policy of deference to
[Vol. 25: p. 784
15
Frank: The End of Legal Kidnapping in Pennsylvania: The Development of a
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
PENNSYLVANIA FAMILY LAW
One of the major goals of the UCCJA is to "deter abductions and
other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody
awards." 116 The Act achieves this goal through the inclusion of a
section which bases the exercise of jurisdiction on the conduct of the
party seeking relief. 117 Section 2309 of the Act, the clean hands pro-
vision, prohibits the Pennsylvania courts from exercising jurisdiction
in a modification case "if the petitioner, without consent of the person
entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child from the phys-
ical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly re-
tained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of
physical custody." 118 There is an exception to this rule when the
court finds that the best interest of the child requires that it exercise
jurisdiction. 119
Similarly, in the case of initial custody jurisdiction, section 2309
states that a Pennsylvania court may decline jurisdiction if the person
initiating a custody proceeding has "wrongfully taken the child from
another state or has engaged in conduct intending to benefit his posi-
tion in a custody hearing." 120 In either an initial custody or a mod-
ification proceeding, a party whose petition is dismissed under this
clean hands provision is subject to having the court charge him "with
necessary travel and other expenses, including attorneys' fees, incur-
red by other parties or their witnesses." 121
the original state's continuing jurisdiction. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §
14, Commissioners' Note, reprinted in 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 111, 155 (1979).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2302(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
117. Id. § 2309.
118. Id. § 2309(b). This provision also permits a court to decline jurisdiction if the petitioner
violates any other provision of a custody decree unless the petitioner can show that "the condi-
tions in the custodial household are physically or emotionally harmful to the child." Id.
This subsection will apply only when the court has the power to modify under § 2315. See
id. § 2315. For a discussion of the need for discretion in the court's exercise of its power to
modify, see UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 8, Commissioners' Note, reprinted
in 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 111, 143 (1979); Bodenheimer, supra note 71, at 1241.
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2309(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980). As the drafters of the UCCJA
explained: "In the case of illegal removal or retention refusal of jurisdiction is mandatory unless
the harm done to the child by a denial of jurisdiction outweighs the parental misconduct."
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 8, Commissioners' Note, reprinted in 9 UN-
IFORM LAWs ANN. 111, 143 (1979).
120. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2309(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980). According to the drafters,
"wrongfully taken" in this subsection means that "one party's conduct is so objectionable that a
court in the exercise of its inherent equity powers cannot in good conscience permit that party
access to jurisdiction." See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 8, Commissioners'
Note, reprinted in 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 111, 142-43 (1979).
This provision of the Act is essentially a codification of the "clean hands" doctrine, long
recognized in courts of equity but first espoused in the custody jurisdiction context by Professor
Ehrenzweig in a 1953 law review article. See id. at 142; Ehrenzweig, supra note 31, at 357-60.
See also H. CLARK, supra note 31, § 11.5.
121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2309(c) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
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The foregoing provisions represent an attempt by the Pennsyl-
vania Legislature to close the doors of the state's courts to parties
engaged in interstate parental kidnapping. By attempting to delineate
the circumstances under which a court may, or must, assume or de-
cline jurisdiction, 122 the Act is clearly intended to avoid the tenuous
assumption of jurisdiction in cases such as Irizarry and its progeny.
123
Consider how the provisions of the UCCJA would have applied
to the facts of Irizarry. 124 Upon learning of his ex-wife's improper
retention of the children after the visitation period had expired, Mr.
Irizarry, armed with his Puerto Rico custody order, would have
sought an expedited hearing in the Pennsylvania court. 125 It is
doubtful that the Pennsylvania court would have had jurisdiction to
modify the Puerto Rico decree under any of the five UCCJA jurisdic-
tional bases previously discussed. 126 The "home state"127 of the
children was Puerto Rico128 since the children had lived there all of
their lives. 129 There was no indication that the children had any
significant connection with Pennsylvania other than two visitation
periods. 130 There was no evidence of abuse or neglect of the chil-
dren which would have allowed the court to assume jurisdiction in
the children's interest. 13 1 Furthermore, the provision allowing
Pennsylvania to assume jurisdiction if no other state had jurisdic-
tion 132 would similarly have been inapplicable since Puerto Rico
clearly would have been considered the "home state" and, thus,
would have had jurisdiction. 133 In addition, the Pennsylvania courts
would have had no power to modify the Puerto Rico decree under
122. See notes 95-120 and accompanying text supra.
123. For a discussion of Irizarry and its progeny, see notes 23-53 and accompanying text
supra.
124. For a summary of the facts of Irizarry, see notes 23-35 and accompanying text supra.
125. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2325 (Purdon Supp. 1980). This section provides:
"Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding which raises a question of existence
or exercise of jurisdiction under this act the case shall be given calendar priority and handled
expeditiously." Id.
126. See notes 97-107 and accompanying text supra. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2304
(Purdon Supp. 1980).
127. For a discussion of the "home state" concept, see notes 96-99 and accompanying text
supra.
128. As previously noted, the UCCJA is a reciprocal Act. See note 93 supra. As of this date,
Puerto Rico has not yet adopted the Act but, for the purposes of this discussion, it will be
assumed that the UCCJA would apply.
129. See 195 Pa. Super, Ct. at 106, 169 A.2d at 308.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2304(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
133. Moreover, § 2304(a)(5), the child welfare provision, would also have been inapplicable
for there was no indication in Irizarry that such an investigation had ever occurred. See id. §
2304(a)(5); note 107 and accompanying text supra.
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section 2315 because Puerto Rico would still have had jurisdiction
while Pennsylvania, as far as can be determined, would not. 134
Thus, if a case identical to Irizarry arose today, Pennsylvania would
lack the power to determine custody.
Even assuming arguendo that a Pennsylvania court would have
had jurisdiction in the technical sense, the clean hands provision of
the Act, section 2309, would still have required the court to dismiss
the case.135  The conduct of the mother in improperly retaining the
children at the end of the visitation period is a striking example of the
type of action which section 2309 was intended to deter. 136  There-
fore, the outcome of Irizarry under the UCCJA would be the com-
plete opposite of the superior court's determination which allowed -
the mother to relitigate the issue of custody.
137
B. The CCCJA
With the enactment of the CCCJA, the parent who takes his
child across county borders in Pennsylvania in order to relitigate cus-
tody faces the same result the UCCJA imposes on the parent who
crosses state lines. Modeled upon the UCCJA, the purpose of the
CCCJA is to discourage parental kidnapping within the borders of the
Commonwealth.' 13  As previously discussed, the decisions of the
Pennsylvania appellate courts allowed the child's home county to be
ousted from jurisdiction, even though the child was taken in contra-
vention of an existing custody order.' 3 9  If only the UCCJA, which
deals exclusively with interstate acts, had been passed in Pennsyl-
vania, the legislature would have permitted parental kidnapping to
continue intrastate, while discouraging it between states.1
4 0
The bases for the assumption of jurisdiction under the CCCJA
are essentially the same as those under -the UCCJA, 14 1 although the
134. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2315 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
135. Id. § 2309.
136. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 8, Commissioners' Note, reprinted
in 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 111, 143 (1979).
137. Not only would the mother in Irizarry have lost under the Act, but she would also have
faced the possible imposition of attorney fees and expenses. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 §
2309(c) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
138. See id. § 2402(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1980); 1 PA. LEG. J. 1092-93 (House, daily ed. April
12, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Rhodes).
139. See notes 39-47 and accompanying text supra.
140. See, e.g., PA. LEG. J. 1092-93 (House, daily ed. April 12, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Rhodes); Turner, Pennsylvania's New Child Custody Venue and Jurisdiction Legislation, 49 PA.
B.A.Q. 471, 473-74 (1978).
141. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2404 (Purdon Supp. 1980). In the CCCJA, the concept of
the "home state" is referred to as the "home jurisdiction." Id. § 2404(a)(i).
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section providing for jurisdiction following the investigation of the
custodial home by a child welfare agency 142 was omitted in the
CCCJA. Another significant difference between the Acts is found in
the CCCJA's clean hands provision. 143 In the case of an initial cus-
tody petition, the CCCJA expressly mandates that Pennsylvania
courts "shall decline to exercise jurisdiction" when the petitioner has
"wrongfully taken the child from another jurisdiction or has engaged
in improper conduct intending to benefit his position in a custody
proceeding." 144 This differs from the UCCJA in that, under the in-
terstate Act, it is within the discretion of the Pennsylvania courts
whether or not they should decline jurisdiction. 14
5
In the case of a party seeking a modification of a custody decree,
the CCCJA's clean hands provision is essentially identical to that of
the UCCJA. Under both the interstate and intrastate Acts, a court is
required to decline jurisdiction when the person seeking modification
has either improperly removed the child from the custodial parent or
has improperly retained. the child after visitation. 146 An additional
ground for declining jurisdiction in modification proceedings exists
under the CCCJA where the child is removed from the jurisdiction of
the court which entered the initial decree without twenty days' writ-
ten notice being given to that court and to "any party entitled to
custody or visitation rights .... "147 The practical effect of this pro-
vision is to prevent the custodial parent from removing the child from
the initial jurisdiction and then attempting, without advance notice,
to modify the other parent's visitation rights in another county far
from the noncustodial parent's residence. This provision attempts to
alleviate the problem faced by the noncustodial parent who is often
unable to enforce his prima facie right to visitation because of his
inability to locate the child.'14
The only exception to the CCCJA's clean hands provision applies
when the petitioner proves that "the conditions in the custodial
household are physically or emotionally harmful to the child" and,
therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction is in the interest of the child
despite the otherwise contemptuous conduct of the petitioner.' 4 9
142. See id. § 2304(a)(5); note 107 and accompanying text supra.
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2409 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
144. Id. § 
2 4 0
9(a).
145. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
146. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2309(b), 2409(b)(1)-(2) (Purdon Supp. 1980); notes 116-18
and accompanying text supra. An exception to this requirement exists under both Acts when
"the interest of the child" necessitates that the court assume jurisdiction. See note 119 and
accompanying text supra; text accompanying note 149 infra.
147. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2409(b)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
148. See notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra.
149. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2409 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
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Thus, with the enactment of the UCCJA and the CCCJA, the
Pennsylvania Legislature has emphatically declared a strong public
policy: a parent may not take his children from the custodial parent in
violation of a subsisting court order. Such a parent will not find a
court in Pennsylvania ready to relitigate rights to custody that had
previously been denied in another forum. As will be discussed, the
Acts are not without problems and potential loopholes. 150 Neverthe-
less, with the passage of these bills, in three short years the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania had come full circle on the issue of paren-
tal kidnapping.
V. CASE LAw AFTER THE ENACTMENT
OF THE UCCJA AND THE CCCJA
Shortly after the Pennsylvania Legislature rejected the jurisdic-
tional concepts traditionally applied in the Pennsylvania courts by
adopting the UCCJA and the CCCJA, the courts also began to reject
the old law in cases initiated prior to the effective dates of the Acts
and, hence, to which the Acts technically were not yet applicable.151
However, the notion that there was a right to relitigate custody de-
terminations in Pennsylvania did not die quickly. Indeed, as late as
April 1978, Judge Hoffman issued a vigorous dissent in Reed v.
High,152 where the superior court agreed in essence to be bound by
an ex parte custody decree rendered by a Mississippi court.
153
In Reed, a habeas corpus action, the superior court held per
curiam that the Pennsylvania lower court had given the respondent a
sufficient opportunity to show a change in circumstances before it
granted the Mississippi decree full faith and credit. 154 Thus, the
court refused to allow any inquiry into the facts of the initial decree.
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Hoffman correctly pointed out that the
150. See notes 179-94 and accompanying text infra.
151. See In re Sagan, 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 396 A.2d 450 (1978); Trefsgar v. Trefsgar, 261
Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 395 A.2d 273 (1978); Reed v. High, 254 Pa. Super. Ct. 367, 385 A.2d 1384
(1978); notes 152-78 and accompanying text infra.
152. 254 Pa. Super. Ct. 367, 372, 385 A.2d 1384, 1386 (1978) (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 369, 385 A.2d at 1384. The mother contended that she did not appear at the
Mississippi hearing on the advice of her attorney. Id. at 368, 385 A.2d at 1384. Subsequently,
she fled to Rhode Island with the child where the father was again awarded custody after a
hearing. Id. The mother then came to Pennsylvania where the father instituted this habeas
corpus proceeding. Id. The lower court gave custody to the father after affording the mother
the opportunity to show a change in circumstances, which she was unable to do. Id.
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court's decision represented a departure from prior case law155 which
he believed wisely subordinated full faith and credit considerations to
the state's interest in the well-being of the children involved.
156
The Pennsylvania superior court's unwillingness to show any
sympathy for snatching parents during this interim period between
the enactment and effective dates is further illustrated by Trefsgar v.
Trefsgar. 157 In Trefsgar, the superior court reversed a lower court's
award of custody to a father who had instituted the custody proceed-
ing during his child's weekend visit.'15 The superior court did not
base its decision on any jurisdictional notions or concepts of full faith
and credit, but rather found that it was in the best interest of the
child for her to be with her mother. 159 In so holding, the majority
found the father's actions in violating a valid custody order by retain-
ing the child after visitation to be a significant factor. 160  The court
stated: "The mother . . . went through the necessary legal channels
to secure permanent custody of the child and was successful. The
father chose not to contest the [Maryland] custody decree ....
Hence his actions were in direct contradiction of the law, and this fact
should have been recognized by the lower court." 161
While the majority in Trefsgar indicated that the father's actions
were merely a factor in determining who should have custody,
162
Judge Spaeth, in a concurring opinion, stated his belief that such
conduct should be determinative. 1'6 3 He pointed out that both par-
ents appeared equally able to serve the child's best interests and,
thus, he faced the question of how such a case should be decided
now that the tender years presumption, which would have tipped the
balance in favor of the mother, was no longer applicable in a custody
155. See 254 Pa. Super. Ct. at 377-80, 385 A.2d at 1389-91 (Hoffman, J., dissenting), citing
Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930); Friedman v. Fried-
man, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 530, 307 A.2d 292 (1973). For a discussion of the law regarding the
finality of custody decrees in Pennsylvania and the nation prior to the enactment of child cus-
tody acts, see notes 17-91 and accompanying text supra.
156. See 254 Pa. Super. Ct. at 380, 385 A.2d at 1390-91 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
157. 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 395 A.2d 273 (1978).
158. Id. at 4-8, 395 A.2d at 275-77. After she had separated from her husband in Pennsyl-
vania, Mrs. Trefsgar took their daughter to Maryland. id. at 3, 395 A.2d 274-75. She then
obtained a custody award in a Maryland court proceeding of which the father had notice. id. at
3-4, 395 A.2d at 275.
159. Id. at 8, 395 A.2d at 277. Apparently the lower court had followed prior Pennsylvania
law in allowing a hearing de novo.
160. Id. at 6-7, 395 A.2d at 276.
161. Id. at 7, 395 A.2d at 276.
162. Id. at 6-8, 395 A.2d at 276-77.
163. Id. at 10-11, 395 A.2d at 278 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
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case.164 Judge Spaeth maintained that he would still have struck the
balance in favor of the mother, not because of the tender years pre-
sumption, but rather because of the father's culpable conduct in ig-
noring the prior custody decree and detaining the child. 165 In dic-
tum, Judge Spaeth also noted that, although not controlling in
Trefsgar, the UCCJA might avoid the problems presented in that
case. 166
The decision in Trefsgar, with its criticism of the parent who
takes the law into his own hands for the purpose of establishing a
jurisdictional advantage, 167 foreshadowed the superior court's decision
in In re Sagan. 168 In Sagan, the court formally rejected its former
jurisdictional approach and adopted the test of the UCCJA, even
though the Act was technically inapplicable. 169
In Sagan, a New York court had awarded custody to the
mother. 170 The father, while one of the children was visiting him in
Pennsylvania, instituted a custody action. 17' The superior court re-
.versed a lower court's grant of the father's petition, holding that the
court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine
custody despite the physical presence of the child in Pennsylvania. 172
In so holding, the Sagan court pointed out that there are com-
peting interests at stake in these cases.173 Although recognizing that
164. See id. at 9-10, 395 A.2d at 277-78 (Spaeth, J., concurring), citing Commonwealth ex
rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977) (other citations omitted). The tender
years doctrine carried a presumption that "the natural mother of a child of tender years was
entitled to its custody." See A. MONsJIAN & N. PERLBERGER, supra note 21, § 5.1.1(b)1 (foot-
note omitted).
165. 261 Pa. Super. Ct. at 10-11, 395 A.2d at 278 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 11, 395 A.2d at 278 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 6-7, 395 A.2d at 276.
168. 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 396 A.2d 450 (1978).
169. See id. at 389-90 & n.5, 396 A.2d at 453 & n.5. The UCCJA was inapplicable in Sagan
because the petition for custody was filed prior to July 1, 1977, the effective date of the Act. Id.
See note 93 supra.
170. 261 Pa. Super. Ct. at 387, 396 A.2d at 451. The parents had married in 1960 and in
1970 they, moved to Ithaca, New York. Id. at 386, 396 A.2d at 451. In 1973, they separated and
the father relocated in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania. Id. at 387, 396 A.2d at 451. Custody
was awarded to the mother in 1975 and the parties were ultimately divorced in 1976. Id.
171. Id. at 387, 396 A.2d at 451.
172. Id. at 389-90, 396 A.2d at 452-53. The court discussed Pennsylvania's old jurisdictional
law which rested jurisdiction on either domicile or residence. See id. at 387-88, 396 A.2d at
452, citing Commonwealth ex rel. Logan v. Toomey, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 80, 84, 359 A.2d 468,
470 (1976); Swigart v. Swigart, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 174, 177, 163 A.2d 716, 718 (1960). The
court then stated: "Appellee would have us equate residence with mere physical presence
within the jurisdictional borders, without reference to the understanding which the parents
have with respect to the duration of that presence .... However, we are unwilling to do so."
Id. at 389, 396 A.2d at 452-53 (citation omitted).
173. See id. at 389-90, 396 A.2d at 453.
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its prior approach, which would have allowed relitigation of custody,
probably resulted in legalized abduction of children, 174 the court also
recognized that such relitigation was consistent with Pennsylvania's
legitimate concern about the welfare of children in the state. 175 The
court balanced these interests by stating: "The experience of recent
years . . . has demonstrated that the most appropriate way to recon-
cile this dilemma of the state's parens patriae concern for the welfare
of those children living within its boundaries . . . on the one hand,
and 'legalized abduction' on the other is to restrict jurisdiction." 171
Noting the recent adoption of the UCCJA, 177 the court ended its
practice of protecting the kidnapping parent by stating:
[W]e hold that unless there is evidence that a minor child has been
abandoned or physically abused, where another state's court has
awarded custody to the parent domiciled in that other state, and
that parent has allowed the child to visit temporarily with the
other parent in Pennsylvania, the child is not a resident of
Pennsylvania, nor does Pennsylvania have sufficient interest in that
child's well being to merit the assumption of jurisdiction by its
courts to relitigate the matter of custody.'
17
VI. FUTURE PROBLEMS
Despite the public policy against child snatching contained in the
Acts, anyone experienced in the litigation of such cases cannot read
them without some concern. One troublesome area involves the in-
terplay between the In re Sagan decision and the UCCJA. The
UCCJA expressly states that it applies only where the other state
involved exercised "jurisdiction substantially in conformity" with the
UCCJA or a similar law. 1 79 The Sagan case's jurisdictional pro-
nouncements, however, appear equally applicable to all interstate
custody disputes without regard to the jurisdictional rules of any
other state involved.180 Consider the situation where the UCCJA is
inapplicable because the other state did not exercise jurisdiction
174. ld.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
177. Id. at 390 n.4, 396 A.2d at 453 n.4. The court added "that absent extraordinary cir-
cumstance, Pennsylvania has no inherent concern for those children who are domiciled
elsewhere and temporarily present solely for the purposes of visit." Id. at 390, 396 A.2d at 453.
178. Id. at 390, 396 A.2d at 453 (emphasis in original).
179. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2307(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980). This provision, however, pro-
vides an exception to the rule stated in the text for it allows the Pennsylvania courts to assume
jurisdiction in the event that the other state involved has stayed its proceedings because
Pennsylvania is a more appropriate forum. Id.
180. See note 178 and accompanying text supra.
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"substantially in conformity" with the Act. What law is then applica-
ble? Arguably, a Pennsylvania court would look to the Sagan deci-
sion. In applying Sagan to such a case, however, the courts would be
enforcing the UCCJA principles in a situation which the Act itself
specifically excepts. The effect is to read this exception out of the Act.
This result is, fortunately, more intellectually stimulating than practi-
cally damaging. The injury, if any exists, is a lessening of uniformity
among UCCJA states, but the public policy behind the Act does not
appear to be violated.
A second question which arises from considering the Acts in con-
junction with Sagan is whether lower courts will read that decision as
a signal that their rulings will be reversed if they are too quick to
assume jurisdiction under the "significant connection" standard of the
UCCJA. 181 By indicating that temporary visitation in Pennsylvania
under an out-of-state order does not trigger any interest in Pennsyl-
vania for the welfare of the child which would allow the assumption of
jurisdiction, Sagan cautions against activism. 18 2  Indeed, a Pennsyl-
vania lower court has intimated that a significant connection between
Pennsylvania and two minor children did not exist where the children
had not been present in the state for twenty-one consecutive months
prior to the custody proceeding, even though the children had re-
sided here for a longer period previously. 183 If the courts continue
to be so influenced by Sagan, then a potential loophole in the
UCCJA may be closed.
Another potentially significant loophole in both Acts is found in
the language which allows the assertion of jurisdiction in a custody
dispute even though the petitioner has improperly removed the child
from the custodian if it is "in the interest of the child."184 This
language creates the possibility that an abducting parent can avoid
181. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2304(a)(2)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
182. See notes 173-78 and accompanying text supra.
183. See Stubblefield v. Dong My Ha, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 751, 753 (C.P. Lancaster 1978).
Stubblefield involved two unmarried parents who lived together in Lancaster County with their
natural children. Id. When they separated in 1976, the father took the children with him to
Oregon. Id. In 1978, the mother took the children back to Pennsylvania without the father's
consent and initiated this custody proceeding. Id. In dictum, the court maintained that
Pennsylvania did not have jurisdiction over the matter since Oregon was the home state and
there was no significant connection present. See id. Nevertheless, the court did not find it
necessary to make that determination for it held that Pennsylvania was an inconvenient forum.
Id., citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2308 (Purdon Supp. 1980). The court also pointed out that
the assumption of jurisdiction in this particular case would contravene one of the purposes of
the act which is to "deter abductions and unilateral removals of children." 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at
754, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2302(5) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
184. See Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2309(b) (Purdon
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the Acts' clean hands provisions, which are clearly intended to deter
such abductions,' 8 5 by merely averring adverse conditions in the cus-
todial home. One state had already opened the door to such machina-
tions. 
18 6
An initial question which must be considered is why there is a
need for such an exception in the Acts at all? The entire concept of
the UCCJA is based upon ending provincial fears and establishing
mutual trust between courts of the various states. 18 7  It is therefore
anomalous in light of the focus of the Acts to maintain that a foreign
court is better able to evaluate evidence of neglect or abuse in the
home state than is the home state itself. Indeed, in such cases it is
particularly important that all relevant evidence be accessible to the
deciding court. Most likely, this evidence will be best gleaned in a
hearing in the child's home jurisdiction.18 8 Thus, it is submitted that
the exception to the clean hands provision is unnecessary.
Certainly, situations may exist where there truly are reasons to
be concerned about the child's welfare if the snatching parent is
forced to return to the home state to litigate custody. In such a case,
however, a court in the home state can always .make use of its own
child abuse procedures to protect the child during the pendency of
the custody litigation.'8 9 The solution which will protect the child
from harm does not lie in allowing allegations of abuse and neglect to
confer jurisdiction on a court which may be thousands of miles away
from the most relevant information about the child. 190
185. See notes 116-21 & 143-48 and accompanying text supra.
186. See Moser v. Davis, 364 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). In Moser, the
Florida court found that jurisdiction existed because of the petitioner's allegations that there was
violence in the custodial home. Id.
187. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, re-
printed in 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 111, 114 (1979).
188. See Note, Family Law: Court's Adoption of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
Offers Little Hope of Resolving Child Custody, 60 MINN. L. REv. 820, 833 (1976).
189. See Child Protective Services Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Supp.
1980). This Act sets forth the procedures by which a child in Pennsylvania can he held in
protective custody. See id. For a discussion of the approaches of various states to the problems
of child abuse, see generally Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected
Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 445 (1978).
190. See Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem: A Reply to
Professor Currie and A Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 185-86 (1965). Profes-
sor Ratner remarked:
An established home forum is probably consistent with the reasonable expectations of
each parent and not too inconvenient for the non-resident. Often that parent has pre-
viously lived there and, in any event, has had a continuing significant contact with the
place where his child last lived for a substantial period. The state where a child is physi-
cally present may always remove the child from the control of a person who is there
abusing it, but that state is not by reason of such general authority necessarily the best
venue for litigating a custody dispute between the . . . parents of any child there present.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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If the UCCJA is going to continue to allow courts to assume
jurisdiction in the best interest of the child, then unambiguous stan-
dards must be provided, defining when the state's interest in the child's
welfare is sufficient to allow the court to assume jurisdiction. As the Acts
stand today, the child welfare exception results in a state of affairs
where there are no clear guidelines as to when a court must decline
jurisdiction because of the petitioner's bad conduct. 191 The only "de-
fined" standard in both Acts exists in the situation where an abduct-
ing parent requests another state to modify and that parent has viol-
ated a provision of the decree other than the provision concerning
who should have the child.192 In such a case, the court may (under
the UCCJA) or shall (under the CCCJA) decline jurisdiction "unless
the petitioner can show that conditions in the custodial household are
physically or emotionally harmful to the child." 193 Yet even this
standard is ambiguous as virtually anything not "in the interest of the
child" is arguably harmful to the child's emotional or physical health.
Therefore, it is suggested that courts should at least require criteria
similar to the equity standard of "immediate and irreparable harm" 194
before opening their doors to abducting parents.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the last three years, Pennsylvania has come full circle-in its
approach to the problem of parental kidnapping. Nevertheless, de-
spite this change in the attitude of both the courts and the legisla-
ture, there still remains the possibility of Pennsylvania sanctioning
child snatching under the ambiguous guise of the best interest of the
child.' 95 As discussed, however, this jurisdictional exception seems
unwarranted in light of the focus of the Acts. 196 Fortunately, the
loopholes created by the exception Can be closed either through nar-
191. For a discussion of how the clean hands provisions permit a court to exercise jurisdiction,
despite bad conduct, because of the "best interest of the child" exception, see notes 184-90 and
accompanying text supra.
192. See Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2309(b) (Purdon
Supp. 1980); Commonwealth Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2409(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1980). The CCCJA also applies this standard with respect to initial jurisdiction in
an abduction case. See id. § 2409(a).
193. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2309(b) (Purdon
Supp. 1980); Commonwealth Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
2309(a)(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
194. See, e.g., United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 11 (1974);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974).
195. See notes 184-94 and accompanying text supra.
196. See notes 187-90 and accompanying text supra.
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row judicial interpretation or hopefully through legislative amend-
ment. 
197
Finally, it must be remembered that even the best of statutes
and the finest case law will not completely resolve the problem.
There will always be parents with sufficient means and/or determina-
tion who will defy court orders and secret their children from the
rightful custodian in some unknown forum. It therefore appears that
the final chapter on this sorry activity will only be written when such
parents, who may believe they are acting out of love, realize that
their actions may emotionally cripple their children for life.
197. See notes 189-94 and accompanying text supra.
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